Sanctions, Solidarity, and the Struggle for a Unified Europe
On 26–27 June 2025, European leaders gathered in Brussels for a routine European Council summit that took an unexpected turn when they failed to agree on the much-anticipated 18th package of sanctions against Russia. Despite broad consensus on the necessity of maintaining pressure on Moscow, Hungary and Slovakia vetoed the proposal—primarily objecting to an EU plan to phase out all Russian fossil‐fuel imports by January 1, 2028—leaving only the extension of existing measures on the table. Below, we unpack the origins and evolution of EU sanctions, the specific sticking points at this summit, reactions from member states, and what the impasse means for Eastern Europe’s energy security and the bloc’s unity.
1. The Evolution of EU Sanctions on Russia
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has rolled out 17 successive sanction packages targeting key sectors of the Russian economy, including finance, energy, defence and technology exports. The stated goals have been threefold: to deplete Russian resources for war, to cut off sanction-busting channels (notably the so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers), and to signal unwavering support for Ukraine.-
The 17th package, agreed in May 2025, expanded price caps on Russian oil and froze additional assets of Russian state-owned banks, while banning the export of certain dual-use goods.
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Energy sanctions have been progressively tightened: an outright ban on seaborne imports of Russian crude was enforced in late 2022, oil products in early 2023, and a cap on pipeline gas purchases followed in 2024. Yet, Hungary and Slovakia have remained dependent on Russian pipelines for the bulk of their energy needs.
2. The 18th Sanctions Package: What’s New?
The European Commission’s proposal for the 18th package, formally presented in mid-June 2025, aimed to deepen the energy chokehold on Russia by:-
Phasing out all Russian fossil-fuel imports by end-2027, with Hungary and Slovakia granted a grace period until January 1, 2028, to accommodate existing gas and crude contracts.
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Expanding restrictions on Russia’s banking sector, including designating more state-owned lenders to the asset-freeze list.
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Targeting Russia’s shadow tanker fleet more rigorously, closing remaining loopholes in ship-to-ship transfers.
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Lowering the global oil-price cap further, from $60 per barrel to $45.
These measures were billed by Brussels as the “toughest yet” and a logical continuation of RePowerEU’s ambition to wean the continent off Russian energy for good.
3. Hungary’s Objections: Energy Dependency and Domestic Pressures
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has consistently opposed any rapid severance from Russian gas and oil, citing national energy security and competitive industrial costs. Orbán argues that:-
Hungary remains heavily reliant on Russian pipeline gas—accounting for over 50 percent of its monthly consumption—without viable immediate alternatives.
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A rushed phase-out risks industrial shutdowns and soaring power prices, inflicting pain on households and factories alike.
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Given Hungary’s historic and economic ties with Gazprom, the government insists on bespoke carve-outs or compensatory financing before it will lift its veto.
In Brussels, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó reiterated that Budapest would not accept a “one-size-fits-all” timetable, demanding that the fossil-fuel phase-out proposal be dropped or substantially re-negotiated as a precondition for any broader package approval.
4. Slovakia’s U-Turn Under Robert Fico
Slovakia, long a reliable supporter of EU sanctions, changed course after the May 2023 election of Prime Minister Robert Fico. Distancing himself from his predecessors’ staunchly pro-Ukrainian stance, Fico has made energy guarantees his top priority:-
Slovakia imports over 85 percent of its gas from Russia via the Brotherhood pipeline and argues that without assurances of alternative supply (or financial aid for new infrastructure), it cannot back sanctions that would leave its citizens and economy exposed.
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Fico demands that any vote on the sanctions package be contingent on a parallel EU proposal to secure gas deliveries—either through expanded reverse-flow from Western Europe or direct LNG contracts.
At the summit, Fico flatly declared Slovakia’s veto would stand until Brussels delivers “real, practical energy solutions,” effectively linking sanctions to a wider political bargain on EU climate and energy policy.
5. Extension of Existing Sanctions: A Compromise of Sorts
With unanimity required for any new measures, the impasse meant the 18th package could not be formally adopted. However, EU leaders did reconfirm the automatic six-month extension of all existing sanctions, ensuring that the 17th package and earlier rounds will remain in force through the end of 2025. This procedural renewal forestalls a gap in the bloc’s restrictions, at least in the short term.Yet, without new measures, the window to tighten the price cap or add further banking targets will close until the next Council meeting—allowing Russia a potential breathing-space to adjust its circumvention tactics.
6. Political Fallout and Eastern European Perspectives
The veto by two Central European members exposes enduring fractures within the EU, especially between net-energy importers and the rest of the bloc. For Eastern Europe, the stakes are particularly high:-
Countries like Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania supported the 18th package, viewing it as essential to accelerate Russia’s economic isolation and to press for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine. They warn that any delay emboldens the Kremlin and prolongs the war.
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Meanwhile, Hungary and Slovakia’s stand has drawn sharp criticism: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk accused them of “holding Europe hostage” to national energy concerns at the expense of collective security.
In capitals from Warsaw to Tallinn, analysts warn that the Brussels gridlock undermines the EU’s credibility as a unified actor on the world stage, potentially weakening deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow.
7. The Fossil-Fuel Phase-Out: Technicalities and Timelines
Under the Commission’s draft, the complete ban on Russian gas and crude would take effect for most member states on 1 January 2027, with Hungary and Slovakia permitted a one-year derogation until 1 January 2028. The rationale was to give these two countries time to:-
Secure alternative pipeline sources via reverse-flow from Austria and Poland.
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Invest in new LNG regasification terminals and gas-storage facilities.
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Roll out renewable energy projects to compensate for lost supplies.
Critics, however, note that building and permitting such infrastructure typically takes 3–5 years, making a 2028 deadline unrealistic without massive EU grants or expedited processes. Budapest and Bratislava insist that only dedicated financing mechanisms—such as an extended REPowerEU fund—could bridge the gap.
8. The Next Steps: Negotiations, Deadlocks, and Deadlines
EU envoys have been tasked with resuming talks in the coming days to find a compromise. Options on the table include:-
Adjusting the phase-out timeline further in exchange for Hungary’s and Slovakia’s support.
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Introducing a special “solidarity fund” to subsidise gas-infrastructure upgrades in the two hold-outs.
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Decoupling energy sanctions from the broader 18th package, allowing non-energy measures to advance separately.
However, these approaches risk creating precedents for carve-outs on other dossiers—such as migration or defence spending—complicating EU decision-making. A fresh vote will likely occur at the next European Council meeting in late September 2025, with the clock ticking for any energy-related restrictions to be ratified before Russia’s winter heating season.
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